SREC markets are a market-based system designed to incentivize solar energy generation. A regulatory body imposes a lower bound on the amount of energy each regulated firm must generate via solar means, providing them with a certificate for each MWh generated. Regulated firms seek to navigate the market to minimize the cost imposed on them, by modulating their SREC generation and trading activities. As such, the SREC market can be viewed through the lens of a large stochastic game with heterogeneous agents, where agents interact through the market price of the certificates. We study this stochastic game by solving the mean-field game (MFG) limit with sub-populations of heterogeneous agents. Our market participants optimize costs accounting for trading frictions, cost of generation, SREC penalty, and generation uncertainty. Using techniques from variational analysis, we characterize firms' optimal controls as the solution of a new class of McKean-Vlasov FBSDE and determine the equilibrium SREC price. We numerically solve the MV-FBSDEs and conclude by demonstrating how firms behave in equilibrium using simulated examples.
1. Introduction. Climate change has emerged as the preeminent global issue of the 21st century, resulting (belatedly) in the increased adoption of policy solutions to promote clean energy generation, or to disincentivize the production of energy via means that produce harmful emissions. A carbon tax is the most popular and well known policy solution which attempts to do the latter.
Among the set of policy implementations aimed at combating climate change are the class of so called market-based solutions. The most well-known of these policies are carbon cap and trade (C&T) markets (also colloquially referred to as emissions markets). An alternative approach is known as 'renewable energy certificate' (REC) markets. In these markets, a regulator imposes a lower bound on the proportion of energy generated from renewable sources that each regulated load serving entity (LSE) sells to the electrical grid, over a given time period (called a compliance period). Any generator (who may be a regulated LSE, but is not necessarily) is granted a certificate for each MWh of energy it generates from said renewable sources. Each regulated LSE must submit certificates in the amount of the lower bound prescribed to it by the regulator, while subject to a monetary penalty for failing to submit the required certificates. This penalty is typically per unit of non-compliance. That is, falling m certificates short of the requirement results in a penalty m times more severe than falling 1 certificate short of the requirement. In practice, these markets consist of many consecutive, non-overlapping compliance periods.
The certificates that generators are granted are tradable. As such, a regulated LSE need not necessarily generate their certificates themselves. Instead, they may purchase the required certificates for compliance on the marketplace. Regulated firms therefore must make a choice about whether to produce electricity from renewable means themselves, or purchase the certificates on the market (or a mix of both). Naturally, firms interact with one another through their behaviours in the REC marketplace and thus each regulated LSE has an impact on every other regulated LSE.
REC markets may also be targeted to a specific type of renewable energy, in order to encourage growth of that particular energy type. The most common of the targeted REC markets are Solar REC (SREC) markets, which have been implemented in many areas in the northeastern United States and Europe (most notably, Sweden and Norway). We primarily focus on SREC markets in this work. In particular, we aim to understand how regulated LSEs 1 should behave in SREC markets, with respect to their mix of SREC generation and trading activity such that they navigate the SREC market at minimum cost. In order to model this in a complete manner, we must consider the potential interactions between agents through their marketplace actions, as well as the possibly heterogeneous nature of the regulated LSEs.
The existing literature on SREC markets focuses heavily on the price formation of certificates. [25] proposes a stochastic model for economy-wide SREC generation, calibrating it to the New Jersey SREC market, and ultimately solves for the equilibrium SREC price. They further investigate the role of regulatory parameters and discuss potential takeaways for the efficient design of SREC markets. Other works, such as [3] and [42] discuss the volatility inherent in REC prices, analyzing the price dynamics of these systems and the reasons for said volatility. In [43] , the authors go one step further, proposing an alternative SREC market design in order to stabilize SREC prices. [52] flips the typical focus of works in SREC markets, using an exogenous price process as an input to model optimal behaviour on the part of a regulated agent in an SREC market, conducting numerical simulation studies to understand and characterize the nature of the firm's optimal controls.
There is considerably more literature on carbon C&T markets, which REC markets resemble. In [51] , the authors represent firm behaviour as the solution to an optimal control problem from the perspective of a central planner overseeing the emissions market in a single-period C&T market and aiming to optimize total expected societal cost. The authors then characterize and solve for the carbon allowance price process. This is further extended to a multi-period C&T market in [35] , which leads to the equilibrium carbon allowance price being expressed as a strip European binary options written on economy-wide emissions. Agents' optimal strategies and properties of allowance prices are also studied by [15] and [14] via functional analysis arguments, within a single compliance period setup. Both works also make significant contributions through detailed quantitative analyses of potential shortcomings of these markets and their alternatives (in [15] ) and of the certificate price and its properties (in [14] ). In each of these four works, the authors argue for the equivalence between the solution to the optimization problem for the central planner and an equilibrium solution whereby each individual agent optimizes their profit. However, these works do not incorporate trading frictions into their model. Additionally, they focus on the implications of the solution to the optimization problem posed on the certificate price, as opposed to the nature of the optimal behaviour of the regulated agents themselves, which is the primary focus of this work. There is also notable work on structural models for financial instruments in emissions markets, such as [36] and [11] .
In this work, we aim to understand how a regulated LSE should navigate an SREC market. As such, we formulate the SREC market as an N -player stochastic game, with each player representing a regulated LSE who controls their planned SREC generation and SREC trading behaviour, aiming to navigate the SREC system at minimum cost. SREC generation is subject to some level of randomness, to represent the inherent variation in weather that impacts ones ability to generate solar energy. Rather than solving the Nplayer stochastic game directly, we turn towards a mean-field game (MFG) approach. This approach aims to approximate the optimal behaviours of large populations of interacting agents in a stochastic game, making it a natural fit to apply to SREC markets.
We use methods from variational analysis to establish existence and uniqueness of a solution to an arbitrary firm's optimization problem, given a particular mean-field distribution. We then fully characterize the optimal controls of a regulated agent and the corresponding mean-field distribution through a McKean-Vlasov FBSDE, which we solve numerically. Finally, we conduct numerical analyses in order to better understand the nature of the solutions, and their associated implications on certificate prices.
MFGs themselves are very well-studied. They were originally developed in the works [39, 40] , and [45] [46] [47] . Many extensions and generalizations of mean-field games and their applications exist. Among them include the probabilistic approach to MFGs and MFGs with common noise and master equation, detailed extensively in [12, 13] , [9] and [7] . Additionally, the theory of MFGs with a combination of major and minor agents was developed in [6, 19, 37, 49] (see also [8] ). In addition to these seminal works introducing the idea of MFGs and approaches to solving them, the numerical analysis of MFGs has also been well-studied. In particular, [4] and [24] study numerical approaches to the solutions of McKean-Vlasov forward-backward stochastic differential equations (MV-FBSDEs), which often characterize the solutions to MFGs. [5] proposes a computational methodology to solve a set of forwardbackward PDEs related to a MFG formulation of cellular communication networks.
MFGs have found numerous applications in engineering [5, 26, 44] , economics [32, 33] , and in particular mathematical finance including optimal execution problems and portfolio trading [10, 18, 20, 21, 28-31, 41, 48] , systemic risk [16, 17, 54] , and commodities markets [2, 22, 34] -just to name a few important contributions.
There are several key differences between our work and the extant literature. To the author's knowledge, this is the first work applying MFG theory to SREC or C&T markets in order to understand the dynamics of the certificate price process as well as the optimal behaviours of agents regulated by these markets. We believe insights into these features of these markets are of interest for regulatory bodies and regulated firms alike. As previously mentioned, this work separates itself from much of the analogous work in the world of C&T markets through its focus on the optimal behaviours of regulated firms in addition to the certificate price process; the former is not explicitly a major focus of much of the prior work in this field. Similarly, the prior literature in this field does not incorporate trading frictions into their modelling of the costs firms face, to the author's knowledge. We explicitly account for this, reflecting the fact that trading is not inherently costless in these markets. Finally, the use of the MFG methodology in this work allows us to capture the interactions between agents which arise through their trading behaviour, and solve each agent's individual optimization problem directly, rather than solving a global problem from the perspective of a central planner aiming to minimize overall economy-wide costs.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we formalize the SREC market and present our model for the regulated firms. Section 3 formally poses the optimization problem that each agent faces in the N -player stochastic game. We introduce the MFG limit of this problem and derive the form of the optimal controls given a particular mean-field distribution in Section 4, using techniques from variational analysis. Further, we are able to characterize the MFG solution as a function of the solution to a McKean-Vlasov FBSDE. Finally, in Section 5, we perform numerical simulations and discuss the key takeaways of the structure of the optimal controls across agents, as well as the implications these controls have on the certificate price and economy-wide compliance probabilities.
2. The Model.
SREC Market Rules and Assumptions.
We assume the following rules for the SREC market, which are exogenously specified and fixed. In an n-period framework, a firm must submit (R 1 , ..., R n ) SRECs at the end of the compliance periods [0, T 1 ], ..., [T n−1 , T n ], respectively. For every SREC below R i at T i that a firm submits, they must pay P i .
Firms receive SRECs through the generation of electricity through solar means. One SREC corresponds to one MWh of electricity produced via solar energy. A firm may also purchase or sell SRECs on the market. Throughout this work, we assume firms may bank leftover SRECs (that are unused for compliance) indefinitely. This is a simplification of reality -in most cases, there are limits on how many times an SREC can be banked. However, this simplification allows us to greatly reduce the dimensionality of our state space, allowing the problem to be computationally tractable. After T n , all firms forfeit any remaining SRECs. T n can be thought of as 'the end of the world' -there are no costs associated with any time after this. In the New Jersey SREC market, the largest and most developed in North America, the current penalty for non-compliance is $258, with the current SREC price slightly below that, at roughly $230 per SREC 2 [53] .
In this work, we focus heavily on a single-period SREC market framework. In this setting, the rules above apply with n = 1. Naturally, there is no concept of banking unused SRECs in a single-period framework. For notational convenience, we remove the subscripts in the quantities described above when discussing the single-period SREC market. That is, the regulated firm is required to submit R k SRECs at time T , representing their required production for the compliance period [0, T ]. A penalty P is imposed for each missing SREC at time T . There are assumed to be no costs after time T .
Model Setup and Motivation.
In this subsection, we formulate the SREC market detailed above as a finite-player stochastic game, where agents are simultaneously striving to achieve maximum profit while interacting with one another through their SREC trading activities. We define the SREC price endogenously; that is, the SREC price is a function of the supply and demand for SRECs across the regulated firms. We allow for agent heterogeneity by defining a finite number of sub-populations of agents with unique behavioural parameters.
We work on the filtered probability space (Ω, F, (F t ) t∈T , P). All processes are assumed to be F-adapted unless otherwise stated. The filtration is defined further later in this section. We assume there are a finite number (N ) of firms and index them by i ∈ N := {1, ..., N }. We further specify that each firm belongs to a sub-population (or class) and index the classes by k ∈ K := {1, ..., K}, with K ≤ N . All agents within a sub-population are assumed to be homogeneous and interchangeable, but are heterogeneous across classes. We also define (2.1) K k := {i ∈ N| agent i belongs to sub-population k}, and N k := |K k | to be the number of firms in class k for all k ∈ K, with k∈K N k = N .
Assumption 1. The proportion of the total population of agents belonging to each class k converges to a constant as the number of firms (N ) increases. That is,
Agent i (belonging to arbitrary sub-population k) can control their planned generation rate (SRECs/year) (g i t ) t∈T (where T := [0, T ]) at any given time and their trading rate (SRECs/year) (Γ i t ) t∈T at any given time. The processes g i and Γ i constitute the control actions of firm i. Trading rates may be positive or negative, reflecting that firms can either buy or sell SRECs at the prevailing market rate for SRECs, respectively. Generation is assumed to be non-negative. We denote the collection of generate rates and trading rates by g t := (g 1 is defined as
where δ x denotes the Dirac measure (unit point mass at x).
are identically distributed, mutually independent and also independent of F W . Moreover,
We denote the equilibrium SREC price process by S g, Γ = (S g, Γ t ) t∈T . With this notation, we emphasize the dependence of the SREC price on the actions of all agents; indeed, the SREC market (and accordingly, the equilibrium SREC price) is the mechanism by which agents interact with one another. We do not make any explicit assumptions about the dynamics of S g, Γ t . Instead, we derive its form endogenously in Section 4.3, through the assumption that trading must be zero-sum among all agents. This results in a market clearing condition that allows us to endogenously derive an analytic formula for SREC price based on the states and behaviours of all regulated agents.
We now introduce the filtration G i = (G i t ) t∈T that an individual adapts their strategy to.
is the sigma algebra generated by the i-th firm's SREC inventory and the SREC price path. Note we assume that all firms have knowledge of the the initial distribution (but not the actual value) of firms' SRECs; that is, firm's have knowledge of µ (k) 0 . Moreover, we define the filtration G := ∨ i∈N G i generated by the SREC inventories of all firms and the SREC price. For all i ∈ N, we have that G i ⊂ F.
We define the set of (individual agent) square integrable controls (2.6)
Assumption 3. The set of admissible controls for firm i ∈ N is
This is a closed and convex set. As an individual firm cannot observe another firms SREC inventory, the restriction in the set above is to G i -adapted, and not G-adapted, strategies.
3. Constructing the Agents Optimization Problem. Each agent chooses their controls with the goal of minimizing the cost (equivalently, maximizing the profit) they incur through the SREC market over the time span [0, T ]. For each i ∈ N, let A −i := Ś j∈N,j =i A j . We also denote A N :
Specifically, the i-th firm (belonging to sub-population k) aims to minimize the cost functional J i,k : A → R where
The agent's objective comprises of four distinct terms. The first corresponds to costs associated with planned SREC generation. Specifically, the agent incurs the cost C k (g, h) per unit time for its level of planned SREC generation. We choose
[2] studies a related problem in the context of expanding solar capacity where costs are quadratic. This is both differentiable and convex, both of which are desirable properties for our analysis. Our cost can be interpreted as stemming from a firm renting solar capacity to increase their planned SREC generation rate. For example, a firm with a constant baseline generation rate of 0 that chooses to generate 5 SRECs / year constantly throughout a compliance period incurs a cost of T 2 ζ k 5 2 over the course of the compliance period. In practice, when firms choose to expand their solar energy generation, they often do so by undertaking projects to build or acquire solar energy generation facilities, which they then operate. This increases their ability to generate solar energy (and thus SRECs) on an ongoing basis. In our model, a firms planned generation choice does not have a long-term impact on their baseline generation rate, as that extension is left for future work.
The second term corresponds to a trading speed penalty. The firm incurs a trading penalty of H k (Γ), per unit time. This induces a constraint on their trading speed. Specifically, we choose
This cost introduces a key difference between our model and the extant literature in the C&T work. As mentioned in Section 1, prior work in this field does not incorporate trading costs of this form into their cost functional for agents (see [35] , [51] , [14] , [15] ). The third term corresponds to the cost (revenue) generated when purchasing (selling) an SREC on the market, with the firm paying (receiving) the equilibrium SREC price S g,Γ t . The fourth and final term corresponds to the non-compliance penalty the firm faces if they fail to submit the required number of SRECs at the end of the compliance period. We allow the requirement to vary based on sub-population. In doing so, we can also incorporate the participants in SREC markets who do not have an RPS obligation at all, but do possess the means to generate SRECs, which they may sell on the market. We observe that the non-compliance penalty is not differentiable at X i T = R k . This poses a problem for our analysis. To avoid issues with differentiability, we introduce a 'regularized' version of the non-compliance penalty. We require this regularized version of the noncompliance penalty to be convex and everywhere once differentiable. Requiring the former maintains the convexity of the optimization problem, and requiring the latter ensures our functional is Gâteaux differentiable everywhere. There are many suitable regularizations; one such example is
2) is obviously convex and everywhere twice differentiable.
With the specific form of the various cost, the performance criterion (3.1) becomes
for agents i ∈ K k . To summarize the key notation introduced in the current and previous section for the readers benefit, we present Table 1 below.
Quantity
Description Units Agents within a sub-population have the same cost parameters, and consequently, those agents act, in equilibrium, in a similar manner. Each individual agent's strategy, however, is adapted to their own inventory and as such, agents' strategies are not identical, even within the same sub-population.
As previously stated, all agents seek to minimize their own costs, and we look for the optimal control for all agents simultaneously. That is, we seek a collection of controls
Additionally, we seek S g,Γ such that
t − a.e, t ∈ T, P a.s. This condition states that trading is zero-sum among regulated agents in the SREC market, and is also known as the market clearing condition. The imposition of this condition allows us to define the equilibrium price S g,Γ t endogenously through the optimal controls.
As the cost functional for each agent is impacted by the actions of all other agents through the price process, solving (3.4) for the finite player game is challenging. As such, in the next section, following the mean-field game methodology, we treat the problem in its infinite population limit (as N → ∞) to make the problem tractable. The goal is to obtain a strategy which is exact in the infinite population limit, that we can then apply to the finite population case, assuming the finite population is sufficiently large.
4. The Mean-Field Game Limit. 4.1. Formulation of the Mean Field Game. The stochastic game specified in the prior sections is difficult to solve directly. Instead, we focus our efforts on solving the stochastic game in the limit as N → ∞ 4 following the mean-field game (MFG) methodology. In the infinite-population limit, the finite player game becomes a MFG where agents interact through the population distribution of states, rather than directly. This makes the MFG simpler to solve than the finite player game, and the formulation of the MFG is the focus of this subsection. Proceeding this, we derive the optimal controls and the equilibrium SREC price.
To begin, we present the infinite-population limit of the problem mathematically, by taking N → ∞. Prior to defining the firm's cost functional in this setting, we make an additional definition. 
is the probability that a representative agent from sub-population k has an SREC inventory belonging to the set A ∈ B(R), at time t.
Furthermore, we define
to be the collection of all mean-field flow of measures.
The mean-field distribution of states µ (k) t is a probability measure representing the distribution of SREC inventory for an agent chosen at random from sub-population k.
In (3.3), only the equilibrium SREC price is dependent on the actions of other agents in the game. In the infinite population limit, we replace S g,Γ A class of mean-field games are characterized by the dependence of an individual agent's cost functional on the mean-field distribution of states. In our problem, this dependence only arises implicitly through S µ t . We postpone the characterization of this dependence until Section 4.3, after we have defined the problem in the mean-field setting, and obtained the functional form of the optimal controls. We do this as S µ t is ultimately derived from the market clearing condition of (optimal) trading being zero-sum across all agents. Until such time, it suffices to consider S µ t as a generic stochastic process that is measurable with respect to each firm's filtration, that ultimately depends on the mean-field distribution defined in Definition 4.1. We also note here that S µ t must be bounded above by P , as a firm would not pay above P to obtain an SREC to avoid a penalty worth P .
Consequently, firm-i's cost functional, i ∈ K k , is now (in matrix form) denoted by J i and equals
Similar to the finite player game, we aim to find the set of strategies that form a Nash equilibrium. That is, we search for a collection of controls
To solve (4.4) and obtain the optimal controls, we use techniques from variational analysis. In the following subsection, we detail the approach that we take in solving (4.4).
4.2.
Deriving the optimal controls. Our approach to deriving the optimal controls is as follows. We initially consider the problem of finding the optimal controls for a particular mean field distribution. That is, we treat some arbitrary µ as an input to the problem. We establish that the cost functional (4.3) is strictly convex and differentiable (in the sense that its Gâteaux derivative exists everywhere in all directions). From here, we find the value of the controls for which the Gâteaux derivative vanishes, in terms of some stochastic process Y i t , as well as µ. The convexity of the functional guarantees such controls are optimal, and moreover, they correspond to a unique global optimum, given the mean-field µ.
Subsequently, we use the form of the optimal controls to present a system of MV-FBSDEs, where we seek a set of mean-field distributions µ such that the forward processes of the solution to the system of FBSDEs we propose has marginal distributions consistent with said mean-field distributions. This approach summarized in Figure 1 . Proof. We must show that J i has the following property: for λ ∈ (0, 1) and two sets of
Formulate FBSDE and solve for
for consistency, for all k ∈ K Figure 1 : Structure of solving for optimal actions and clearing prices in the mean-field game limit.
To do so, first write
We prove that G i is strictly convex and H i is convex, which implies that J i is strictly convex.
Let us first consider G i . As Q k is positive definite, the first term is strictly convex in the controls. The second term is linear in the controls, and thus is also convex (though not strictly convex). The third term is independent of the controls. Through the linearity of integrals, and since the sum of a strictly convex and a convex function is strictly convex, it is clear that G i a strictly convex functional of the controls.
It remains to show that H i (g i , Γ i ; µ) is a convex functional of the controls.
Therefore, H i is convex, and J i is strictly convex.
We next establish the Gâteaux derivative of (4.3) exists and determine its explicit form.
Proposition 4.3 (Existence and form of Gâteaux derivative). The cost functional J i (·, ·; µ), for i ∈ K k , is everywhere Gâteaux differentiable in A i in all directions. The Gâteaux derivative at a point (g, Γ) ∈ A i in the direction of (ω g , ω Γ ) admits the following representation
Proof. The Gâteaux derivative we seek are given by the limits
, and (4.10a)
We examine each of these limits in turn, starting with (4.10a). To this end,
which follows from the definition of the cost functional (4.3) and the state dynamics of X i t (2.3). From Taylor expansion of F δ , we have
Substituting (4.12) into (4.11) and performing some algebra, we obtain
Dividing by and taking limits on both sides implies
Next, apply iterated expectations we obtain 15) as required. Through the same techniques applied to (4.10b), we obtain (4.8b) and the proof is complete.
Before continuing, we make two observations about Y i t . Firstly, for all agents i ∈ K k , the process Y i t admits the representation
Secondly, Y i t is approximately the non-compliance probability for firm i from subpopulation k. To see this, recall that F δ (x) is a convex and differentiable approximation of a(x) = (x) + , and a (x) = 1 x>0 , for x = 0 d.n.e, for x = 0.
Due to the differentiability assumption on F δ , we have that F δ (x) δ→0 −→ a (x) pointwise a.e., and for δ sufficiently small
Thus, we often refer to Y i t as the non-compliance probability for agent i at time t. From Propositions 4.2 and 4.3, J i is convex and everywhere Gâteaux differentiable in all directions. This implies that an element ν ∈ A i that makes the Gâteaux derivative vanish for all directions is a minimizer of J i , and moreover, that minimizer is unique. We now establish the conditions which are sufficient and necessary for the Gâteaux derivative to vanish, which allows us to find (4.4) and interpret the optimal controls in the context of SREC markets. 
Proof. Sufficiency: Assume (4.16a)-(4.16b) holds. It is clear from Proposition 4.3 that (4.17)
, ω = 0, ∀ω ∈ A i . We next show that (4.16a)-(4.16b) hold. We prove this via the contrapositive. Assume that (4.16a)-(4.16b) do not hold. Then
has positive measure. We further define:
At least one of the two sets defined above has positive measure.
Suppose that B pos has positive measure. Define the processes
, and (4.21)
As all processes on the RHS of both expressions are G i -adapted, ω g t , ω Γ t are as well. This together with the boundedness of h k t , Y i t , and S µ t , and non-negativity of ω g t , imply that (ω g t , ω Γ t ) ∈ A i . Therefore, from (4.8a), we obtain
If, on the other hand, B pos does not have positive measure, then B neg must, as B has positive measure. In this case, set
Once again, the pair (ω g , ω Γ ) ∈ A i . In a manner similar to the above, we obtain that DJ i , ω g < 0. Hence, we have found an admissible ω g such that DJ i , ω g = 0.
Next, from (4.8b), we obtain
Thus DJ i (g i , Γ i ), ω = 0, and the proof of necessity is complete.
These set of results allow us to determine the optimal controls in the mean-field game limit.
Proposition 4.5 (Optimal Controls)
. Given a mean-field flow µ, the collection of controls {g i, t , Γ i, t } i∈N is a unique solution to (4.4) if and only if for each agent i ∈ K k , (g i, t , Γ i, t ) ∈ A i , and the Gâteaux derivative vanishes for all ω ∈ A i .
In particular, the optimal controls for agent i ∈ K k are
Proof. The first part of this proposition is taken care of by Proposition 4.2 and Proposition 2.1 in [27] .
All that remains is to show that g i, t and Γ i, t in (4.23)-(4.24) are admissible. Observe that h k t is deterministic, non-negative, and bounded. Y i t is, moreover, non-negative and bounded (by definition of F δ ), as well as G i -adapted (by construction). Therefore, g i, is admissible. Similarly, as Y i and S µ are G i -adapted, and bounded, clearly, (4.23)-(4.24) satisfy Proposition 4.4, and we have completed the proof.
, the optimal controls specified in (4.23) and (4.24) admit the representations The controls in (4.23) and (4.24) provide us with insight about the nature of regulated firms optimal behaviour. P Y i t may be interpreted as the expected non-compliance cost avoided by obtaining a marginal SREC. This can also be seen as the marginal benefit of holding an additional SREC.
With this interpretation in mind, we can restate (4.23) as the following:
This is equivalent to stating that the marginal cost of generation should be equal to the marginal benefit of generation 6 . Isolating g t suggests that a firm should generate their baseline rate plus some amount proportional to the marginal benefit of holding an additional SREC. This makes intuitive sense, as it implies a firm that is in danger of non-compliance generates above their baseline in order to strive for compliance. Conversely, a firm that is assured of compliance generates their baseline, which they obtain without incurring any cost. Similarly, we can interpret (4.24) as the optimal trading rate of a firm being proportional to the difference between the marginal value of holding an SREC and the marginal value of selling an SREC. This is scaled by the firm's cost of trading. Once again, this is a natural and intuitive result. If SREC prices are high relative to the benefit a firm would receive from holding an SREC, a firm is more inclined to sell SRECs (and vice-versa). The degree to which this occurs is dependent on the difference between these two quantities, as well as the cost the firm incurs by partaking in the market (γ k ).
We emphasize here that the results in the preceding section hold given some µ. With this, we obtain the existence and uniqueness of the optimal trading and optimal planned generation of an arbitrary firm i in an arbitrary sub-population k through Proposition 4.5. However, the mean-field distributions as discussed in Definition 4.1 are not arbitrary and are not to be chosen freely. Specifically, they must correspond to the marginal distributions of the agents SREC inventories. As per (2.3), the marginal distribution of an agent's SREC inventory is in fact governed by their optimal controls, which depend on µ. This circular dependence underlies the core of the MFG methodology, and we must discuss how to find such a µ. However, before doing so, we characterize the dependence of the firms optimal controls on the mean-field distribution by finally obtaining S µ t that clears the market.
Equilibrium SREC Price.
We begin this section by examining the SREC price implied by the mean-field solution for the finite-player game. Specifically, consider the SREC price that results in the market clearing condition being satisfied, under the assumption that firms behave per (4.23) and (4.24) . This is the market clearing SREC price in the finite player game. Proposition 4.6 (Market Clearing SREC Price in Finite Player Game). In the setting of the finite-player game described in Section 2, suppose that:
1. The market clearing condition holds.
2. Firms behave as per the optimal controls for the mean-field game (i.e. they generate and trade according to (4.23) and (4.24)). The market-clearing SREC price is
Proof. We begin with the market clearing condition.
=
as required. The second equality arises from substituting (4.24), and each subsequent equality is through simple algebraic operations.
As a reminder, Y i t may be interpreted as the firm-i's non-compliance probability. The form of (4.28) implies a few notable properties of the SREC price. By the definition of Y i t in (4.9), S g,Γ t ∈ [0, P ] as expected. SREC prices increase as firms increase their noncompliance probabilities, which results from the fact that increasing demand for SRECs (from firms who are far from compliance) increases the price. The opposite holds true as well; as firms decrease their non-compliance probabilities (that is, they are highly likely to comply), the SREC price decreases.
Finally, while Y i T is either 0 or 1 for all i ∈ N, depending on whether firm i has sufficient SRECs to comply, it does not imply that S g,Γ t converges to 0 or P , as the SREC price is a weighted average of non-compliance probabilities across all agents/types. We now specify the form of the equilibrium price S µ t in the infinite-player game. As previously mentioned, this is derived endogenously, through the optimal behaviours that emerge from the agents optimizing their respective cost functionals, and the market clearing condition (3.5).
Proposition 4.7 (Equilibrium SREC Price in Infinite Player Game). In the setting of the infinite-player game described in Section 4, we further assume that:
• The market clearing condition holds • Firms behave as per the optimal controls for the mean-field game (i.e. they generate and trade according to (4.23) and (4.24)). The equilibrium SREC price is then given by
Proof. We begin from the result of Proposition 4.6.
This represents the finite-player equilibrium SREC price. Recall that in the mean field limit, both N and N k go to ∞, for all k ∈ K, and N k N = π k . We note that N k i=1 Y i t N k represents the empirical average of Y i t among agents in sub-population k. As the number of agents grows, this will tend towards the average of Y t across agents in this sub-population with respect to the true distribution of agents, µ k t . As such, we can define S µ t = lim N →∞ S g,Γ t to be described (in the infinite population limit) as
as required.
(4.33) may be interpreted as follows:
is the average non-compliance probability within sub-population k, and (ii) the SREC equilibrium price is a weighted average over sub-populations (scaled by P ) where the weights are proportional to the ratio of that sub-population and its trading costs π k γ k .
The equilibrium SREC price in the infinite-player game has many of the same properties as the market clearing SREC price in the player game. Namely, it also takes values on the range [0, P ], is impacted the same way by the non-compliance probabilities of the regulated firms, and is not necessarily pinned to 0 or P as t → T . The finite population market clearing SREC price (4.28), however, is stochastic, as Y i t = Y (k) (t, X i t ; µ), for i ∈ K k , and X i t is stochastic. This is in contrast to (4.30) , which is deterministic, as discussed in the remark below.
0 . In (4.34), there are K distinct forms of equations (each agent within a sub-population satisfies the same form of FBSDE).
Proof. Substitute (4.23), (4.24), and (4.30) into (2.3) to obtain (4.34a). Observe that Y t is a martingale, and hence can be expressed as in (4.34c) (see Chapter 6 of [50] ).
We next aim to solve for the fixed-point. That is, we seek a mean-field distribution µ and a progressively measurable triple (X i , Y i , Z i ) = (X i t , Y i t , Z i t ) t∈T that satisfies (4.34), such that µ (k) t coincides with L(X i t ) for all i ∈ K k , for all k ∈ K. This is a fixed point problem on the space of flows of measures.
At this fixed point, µ (k) t is replaced with L(X i t ) in (4.34) , and results in the FBSDE becoming a McKean-Vlasov FBSDE (MV-FBSDE). Such equations are characterized by their dependence on the law of its solution and arise in the probabilistic formulation of mean-field games. For more details on MV-FBSDEs, see Chapter 3.2.2 of [13] . Armed with a solution to the MV-FBSDEs, we arrive at the full characterization of all agents' optimal actions (4.4) and the resulting equilibrium SREC price (4.30) .
Solving MV-FBSDEs analytically is difficult, in all but the simplest situations. Rather, we devise a numerical scheme to solve the MV-FBSDE and relegate the presentation and discussion of this scheme to Appendix A. We use our numerical scheme to perform a variety of experiments, which we discuss in Section 5.
Numerical Experiments.
In this section, we present the results of numerical experiments which reveal significant qualitative characteristics about how regulated firms behave in this model and the associated implications of this behaviour. We aim for these experiments to be illustrative and provide insight into the agents' optimal behaviour in emissions markets while explicitly accounting for trading frictions and interactions between them, which to the authors' knowledge, has not been done before.
There are many viable experiments that one could run within this model framework, especially when considering the potential variety and number of sub-populations of load serving entities that are regulated by SREC markets. As such, we restrict focus to a handful of interesting and meaningful experiments that allow us to draw insights into the drivers of optimal behaviour in SREC markets, the nature of the interaction between agents, and the outcomes of agents acting optimally.
The scarcity of accessible data introduces a significant challenge for obtaining calibrated model parameters. For example, we do not have data relating to costs firms incur for choosing to generate or trade SRECs. Consequently, we instead focus on highlighting the key features and outcomes that we believe are applicable to any emissions market system, and aligning said features and outcomes with economic arguments that justify their validity and applicability. That is, we provide normative rather than informative results.
For the first set of numerical experiments, we use the parameters reported in Tables 2  and 3 . For simplicity of analysis and interpretation, we choose h k t and σ k t to be constant and set X i 0 ∼ N (ν k 0 , ψ k 0 ) for all i ∈ K k , with the values specified in Table 3 .
n ∆t T P ($/SREC) R k (SREC) K As T = 1, n = 1, we are focused on a single-period SREC market that takes place over a year. Firms must submit 1 SREC at T , and pay a penalty of $1 for every SREC they fail to submit. We assume K = 2, with each sub-population having parameters detailed in Table  3 . Specifically, we assume a 3:1 ratio in favour of sub-population 2. When comparing the Tables 2 and 3. two sub-populations, we see that sub-population 2 has a greater generation rate (h k ) and a slightly higher volatility associated with generation (σ k ) than sub-population 1. They also have lower generation costs (ζ k ), while experiencing a higher level of trading costs (γ k ). Finally, we see the average initial inventory of firms in sub-population 2 is lower than in sub-population 1.
Optimal Behaviour Summary.
A regulated firm's optimal behaviour is one of the key outputs from (4.34). Figure 2 shows the dependence of the optimal trading and generation rate on banked SRECs for a representative agent of each sub-population through time. The equilibrium SREC price S µ t is implicitly accounted for through the solution of the MV-FBSDE. In this mean-field limit, individual firms have no impact on the price.
One clear pattern seen in Figure 2 is the existence of distinct regimes of generation / trading. This pattern also arises in the single-agent problem (see [52] ). At low levels of SREC inventory, and towards the end of the period, firms in both sub-populations generate / purchase until the marginal cost of producing / purchasing an additional SREC exceeds P . This occurs because, in this case, the firm almost certainly fails to comply. By generating or purchasing an additional SREC, the firm avoids paying an additional penalty of P , and as such, it is in their best interests to do so until the cost of generation / trading exceeds that value. This follows the classic microeconomic principle of conducting an activity until the marginal benefit of that activity equals its marginal cost.
As a firm obtains more SRECs, they reach a point where the marginal benefit from an additional SREC is less than P . Specifically, as the probability of compliance increases increases from near 0, additional SRECs no longer provide a marginal benefit of P (as additional SRECs above R k must either be sold for less than P , or expire worthless). As such, it is no longer necessary for firms to generate / purchase in such quantities, leading to a decrease in both quantities. Once again, the firm adjusts its behaviour so that the marginal costs of purchasing and trading are in line with the marginal benefit the firm receives from doing so. This may also lead to the firm selling SRECs as opposed to purchasing them -in this case, the net proceeds from sales exceed the value of an additional SREC to the firm.
This decrease occurs until the firm reaches a point where it no longer benefits from additional SRECs. Specifically, this means that an additional SREC does not impact a firms compliance probability (implying their compliance probability is 1), nor can they sell it for profit. Consequently, we observe another plateau where the firm plans to generate at its baseline h k and plans to sell SRECs at the value for which the marginal revenue from the sale equals the cost of selling. The previous observations are consistent for each sub-population.
The optimal firm behaviour detailed above, along with their initial inventory (determined by the distribution of X i 0 , i ∈ K k ) also imply a mean-field distribution of SREC inventory levels across agents of each sub-population. We examine this distribution across each agent sub-population and for various times t ∈ T in Figure 3 .
From Figure 3 , we can make some notable observations. For both sub-populations, we see the initial distribution is concentrated around their respective mean ν k 0 . As time progresses, mass shifts upwards, as firms accumulate SRECs, culminating with the mass being concentrated around R k as t approaches T . This is also reflected in the bottom panel, which shows the distribution of SREC inventory across all agent types, incorporating the relative frequency of each sub-population. It shows the bimodal nature of the initial distribution slowly converge to a unimodal distribution by the time the compliance period ends, with the mode occurring near the requirement.
The patterns detailed above are expected, as they indicate agents aim to satisfy the compliance requirements. Specifically, about 62% of agents in sub-population 1 and 61% of agents in sub-population 2 meet the requirement. It is worth noting that the optimal behaviour for firms does not result in every firm complying exactly.
The primary cause of this phenomenon is that firms do not have absolute control over their SREC production. While the firm plans to generate at a rate of g i , they over or Tables 2 and 3. under-generate due to, e.g., variation in sunlight. If a firm severely under-generates, they may not be able to comply. The market frictions imposed by our model, such as trading costs also constrain firms' behaviours, which may also force non-compliance. Additionally, in a single-period SREC model with no banking, a terminal SREC inventory above the requirement necessarily implies some SRECs are squandered, as unused SRECs at time T are worthless. As such, the funds used to acquire these spare SRECs (either through generation or trading) are also wasted. This means that it is typically not optimal to accumulate far more than R k SRECs, as firms must strike a balance between securing compliance and risking unnecessary investment. The natural incentive for all firms is to just barely satisfy the requirement, as opposed to exactly satisfying it (which would waste no SRECs), so that they are partially protected from a potential random under-generation.
As alluded to earlier, in the mean-field limit, the equilibrium SREC price that the firms transact at is not impacted by any individual agent. Rather, as per (4.30), it is determined by the collective distribution of agents. Consequently, the equilibrium SREC price S µ t is an output of our algorithm, as opposed to a state variable or an input. The initial distribution of agent states amongst sub-populations and the optimal behaviour of each regulated agent throughout the period implies a value for S µ t over time. With the parameter choices made in Tables Table 2 and Table 3 , the S µ t implied by the mean-field optimal controls is nearly constant throughout the compliance period, at a value of roughly 0.39.
Careful examination of the form of (4.30) can provide insight as to why this occurs. First, from general results (see [38] ), we know that the mean-field measure flow is deterministic. Second, the only term which potentially varies over time in the formula for S µ t is Y (k) (t, x; µ)µ (k) t (dx) and represents the expected non-compliance probability of an agent in sub-population k. The near-constant nature of S µ t indicates that this quantity does not change much over time in the infinite-population limit. This suggests that, in the infinitepopulation limit, the mean-field distribution µ (k) t changes over time in such a way that such that expected non-compliance probabilities are essentially constant. That is, the trajectory of the average non-compliance probability across each sub-population of agents at each time t is constant. When we explore the finite-player game in Subsection 5.2, we show that the empirical distribution of agents' states is stochastic, in contrast to the mean-field limit.
Finite-player Simulation.
While the previous subsections focus on studying the behaviour and properties of the solution to the infinite population stochastic game, we now turn our attention to the finite population game. We study the infinite player game because it is more tractable than the finite player stochastic game. However, it is worth numerically studying how the infinite-population solution fares when applied to a more realistic finitepopulation game, and the associated implications on the SREC price (which is now the market clearing SREC price described by (4.28) , as opposed to the equilibrium SREC price described by (4.30)).
We simulate a compliance period for N firms, using the same model and compliance parameters as in Table 2 and Table 3 , and letting N = 2000 7 . That is, we assume 500 firms from sub-population 1 and 1500 firms from sub-population 2. For each firm, we draw their initial SREC inventory from µ k 0 (using the appropriate sub-population), and simulate forward. At each time-step, each firm chooses their planned generation and trading behaviour, as per (4.23) and (4.24), while being able to observe the SREC price. In doing so, each firm is exposed to their idiosyncratic SREC production noise, which in turn impacts the agents' state in the next time-step, as well as the SREC price. This continues across the entire period.
We first summarize the overall behaviours of agents of each sub-population by plotting, in Figure 4 , histograms of their initial and terminal SRECs, as well as their total generation and trading.
As expected, we see that most firms from both sub-populations take actions such that their terminal SREC inventory is near R k = 1. The non-compliance rates for subpopulations 1 and 2 are about 0.42 and 0.40, respectively. The means of the total generation and trading for firms from each sub-population are slightly higher than 0.4 and 0.8, respectively. These figures correspond to the average amount of SRECs below the requirement firms from each sub-population begin the compliance period with. We also see that total generation and trading in the finite player game is relatively symmetric.
Finally, we note that the shapes of the optimal generation and trading histograms are similar within sub-populations, suggesting there may be some correlation between firm-level Tables 2 and 3. optimal generation and trading over the course of a compliance period. Given the forms of (4.23) and (4.24), we would expect this to be the case. To see this, consider (4.23)
substitute into (4.24) for Γ i, t 8 , and integrate from 0 to T , to obtain From (5.1), total trading and planned generation have a linear relationship, with slope ζ k γ k . This reflects the fact that firms with a relatively high cost of generation prefer to trade, and vice-versa. To confirm that this relationship holds in the simulation, we plot the total generation versus trading stratified by sub-population in Figure 5 .
The positive linear relationship, in conjunction with the relatively small variance of terminal SRECs (as firms tend to target the requirement almost exactly in order to avoid wasting resources on spare SRECs) suggest that firms who experience under-generation increases planned generation and purchasing to account for it, with firms experiencing over-generation doing the opposite.
We next examine the firms' trading and generation behaviour across the compliance period. To this end, we plot each firm's generation and trading rates over the course of the compliance period, colour coded by the sub-population they belong to, in Figure 6 . Figure 6 shows the differences between the two sub-populations planned generation and trading rates.As expected, firms from sub-population 1 generate less than those from subpopulation 2, due to their lower baseline generation rate and higher cost of generation. The trading rates across firms from different sub-populations largely overlap one another, though the firms from sub-population 1 typically have more extreme behaviour, reflecting their increased capability to participate in the market when compared to firms from subpopulation 2.
Next, we look at the distribution of states across agents to ensure the distribution of Tables 2 and 3. agents in the finite-player sample agrees with those from the mean-field game (see Figure 3 ). To this end, Figure 7 shows histograms of the agents states across the compliance period overlaid on the mean-field distribution (scaled for finite-population). From the figure, we can see that the empirical and theoretical distributions are in alignment with one another, suggesting numerically that the infinite-population solution is a reasonable approximation for the optimal controls of the agents in the finite-population problem, provided the number of agents is sufficiently large. Tables 2 and 3 .
Finally, we examine the how the equilibrium SREC price evolves in this finite-population game, when compared to the infinite-population scenario. To do so, we plot the implied equilibrium SREC price, S t , which is endogenously derived at all times t through (4.28), in Figure 8 .
The most immediate difference is that the SREC price now has notable variation. More specifically, this variation is determined by the states of the agents, which themselves depend on the degree of over/under-generation that they experience.
In this case, we see that the SREC price stays relatively constant for the first three quarters of the compliance period, then rapidly increases over the remainder. This suggests that firms non-compliance probabilities increased over the final parts of the period, resulting in increased demand for SRECs, as firms scramble to ensure they comply. Additionally, we see that the SREC price does not converge to either 0 or P at time T , as is implied in previous work in C&T as well as SREC markets (see [25] , [35] , [51] , [14] , and [15] ). This property is consistent with the comments made in Section 4.3 regarding the form of the finite-player market clearing SREC price.
Conclusion.
We introduce an N -player stochastic game for an SREC market with heterogeneous sub-populations, where each player aims to navigate the market at minimum cost by modulating their planned SREC generation and trading activities. By taking the infinite-population limit of the model, we obtain a MFG for the market, which is a more tractable problem. Using tools from variational analysis, we are able to express the optimal controls of each agent as the solution to a McKean-Vlasov FBSDE, and thus we are able to characterize the Nash equilibrium of the MFG. We also are able to numerically solve the FBSDE, allowing us to run numerous experiments that allow us to better understand the structure of the optimal controls of the agents, and the associated implications on the SREC price and on non-compliance probabilities of each sub-population of agents.
In particular, we see that the optimal behaviours of agents expressed as a function of their SREC inventory exist in regimes corresponding to the benefit a firm receives by acquiring an additional SREC. This is reinforced when observing the functional forms that the optimal controls take. Additionally, we observe that while the infinite-player SREC price process is deterministic, in the N -player stochastic game with agents behaving as per the MFG solution, this is not the case. Instead, we see notable price volatility, particularly towards the end of the compliance period, as firms have less time to react to any unforeseen shocks that impact their compliance probability. We also discover a positive linear relationship between total planned generation and total trading for each firm.
There are natural areas for improvement, and possible extensions to this work. Calibration to real-world data remains challenging due to a lack of transparency into the underlying cost functions of regulated LSEs, but is nonetheless a critical next step. Similarly, extending this work to a multi-period SREC market is another area that must be explored further. Nonetheless, in providing the mathematical framework contained in this paper, we have produced a logically consistent and coherent structure under which SREC markets (and indeed, any emissions market) can be studied holistically. We feel such a framework is potentially of great use to regulatory bodies and regulated firms in these systems alike, and aim to continue to refine the work in this area further. D. Initialize µ. We assume that all agents generate at their baseline h k t and do not take part in the SREC market (trading is 0). This assumption, along with the initial distribution of SRECs implied by ξ k , implies a distribution of SRECs across agents at each time-step (for each sub-population) through (2.3) which is denoted by µ (0) . E. Initialize Y t j for all t j ∈ T and all x ∈ X under the assumption that all agents generate at their baseline h k t and do not take part in the SREC market.
Iteratively update
A. Let q = q + 1 B. Update Y t : For t j ∈ T , from T to 0:
• Compute the mean and variance of X t j+1 |X t j = x through (4.34a) using the previous update of Y t , µ (q−1) . • For all x u ∈ X, assume that Y t j+1 = Y (k) (t j+1 , x u ; µ (q−1) ) is locally linear in x u . Use this (in conjunction with (4.34c) and (2.3)) to analytically calculate Y k t j for each point x ∈ X. C. Update the mean field distribution to find µ (q) :
For t j ∈ T , from 0 to T : For k ∈ K • Use the updated Y t j along with (4.34a) to characterize the mean and variance µ (q),k t j Denote µ (q) = {(µ (q),k t j ) t∈T } k∈K D. Calculate D := d(µ (q) , µ (q−1) ) for some notion of distance between measures, d.
If D > , return to Item 2. Else, proceed to Item 3.
Output
Use the calculated values to compute (4.16a), (4.16b), (4.30).
